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BANKS RUNNING WILD: THE 
SUBVERSION OF INSURANCE 
BY “LIFE SETTLEMENTS” AND 
CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
marshall auerback andl. randall wray
Oblivious to any lessons that might have been learned from the global financial mess it has cre-
ated, Wall Street is looking for the next asset bubble. Perhaps in the market for death it has found
a replacement for the collapsed markets in subprime mortgage–backed securities (MBSs) and
credit default swaps (CDSs). 
Recall the principles behind these instruments. An MBS is a bond issued against a pool of
hundreds, even thousands, of mortgages. The pool can be “tranched” so that bonds of different
ratings can be derived, allowing “investors” to choose the risk-return trade-off desired. Pooling
was supposed to reduce risk through diversification; risk raters further reduced risk through care-
ful analysis—allowing 80 percent or more of the derived bonds to carry ratings as high as those
enjoyed by the U.S. Treasury. Insurance on the securities added another level of safety. A CDS was
one way of buying insurance against losses on the securities, with the seller providing a guarantee
in return for a periodic “premium.” Indeed, one could buy CDS “insurance” even if one did not
hold the security. Thus, through the CDS market one could effectively take on the risk of an MBS
without the inconvenience of actually purchasing and holding a security. This amounted to noth-
ing more than a gamble, with the CDS seller betting against default and the buyer hitting the jack-
pot if default occured. Both markets were blown apart by a perfect storm: the risks of subprime
mortgages, which were never really assessed, turned out to be far greater than the markets supposed;
underwriting standards deteriorated to the point that outright fraud was actually encouraged;at thesame time, documentation was so lax that in many cases it is
not clear which—if any—mortgages actually underlay some of
the securities; and most of the market was “over the counter”—
unregulated and opaque. It is not necessary to recount all of the
sorry details, except to note that the market for both MBSs and
CDSs is moribund.
That is why the banking system is attempting to fuel yet
another bubble, this one built on a new product very similar to
CDS “insurance.” Instead of making bets on the “death” of secu-
rities, this one will allow “investors” to gamble on the death of
human beings. As the New York Times recently highlighted, the
banks “plan to market ‘life settlements,’ buying life insurance
policies that ill and elderly people sell for cash—$400,000 for a
$1 million policy, say, depending on the life expectancy of the
insured person. Then they plan to ‘securitize’ these policies, pack-
aging hundreds or thousands together into bonds. They will
then resell those bonds to investors, like big pension funds, who
will receive the payouts when people with the insurance die”
(Anderson 2009). In effect, just as the sale of a CDS creates a
vested interest in financial calamity, here the act of securitizing
life insurance policies creates huge financial incentives in favor
of personal calamity. In essence, the sooner you die, the bigger
the payoff for the investor. And the corollary also applies, as the
Times article notes: “If people live longer than expected, investors
could get poor returns or even lose money.”
In this Policy Note we argue that this is a subversion—or
an inversion—of insurance, similar to the role played by CDS
“insurance.” CDSs were never really insurance; they simply
allowed gamblers to bet on the survival of bonds, firms, and
even nations. Indeed, as we explain, the existence of CDSs actu-
ally hastened the entity’s “death.” Similarly, owners of the new
life settlement products actually have an interest in an early
death, unlike the life insurance industry—which has an interest
in seeing life prolonged. It is, of course, a huge jump to say that
simply because it is in one’s financial interest to see underlying
human “collateral” meet an untimely death, owners of these
new securities would actually undertake actions to ensure that
result. Still, it raises important public policy issues: Should we
allow the marketing of an instrument in which holders have a
financial stake in death? More generally, should we allow the
“innovation” of products that condone speculation under the
guise of providing insurance? Here, we first examine the nature
of true insurance, show how the CDS products subvert this, and
then analyze the new life settlement securities.
Traditional Insurance versus Credit Default Swaps
Insurance is traditionally defined as a promise of compensation
for specific potential future losses in exchange for a periodic
payment. The underlying purpose, then, is to protect the finan-
cial well-being of an individual, company, or other entity in the
case of unexpected loss. Implicit in this concept is that the indi-
vidual, company, or other entity has an insurable interest to be
protected in the event of unexpected loss.
That is, of course, until Wall Street’s financial engineers
started tinkering with the concept through the creation of
credit default swaps. Just as the mortgage industry gamed the
regulatory system for lending, the CDS dealer banks—led by
Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and JPMorgan Chase—have gamed
the political equation in Washington with great skill. In fact,
aided in their efforts by Alan Greenspan, Robert Rubin, and
then–SEC head Arthur Levitt, these banks got Congress to push
through a moratorium on regulating all over-the-counter deriv-
atives,of which credit default swaps were an important compo-
nent. The moratorium specifically prohibited states from
regulating CDSs as insurance, which effectively meant no regu-
lation, since the states, not the federal government, were (and
still are) charged with regulating the insurance business. Wall
Street’s political objectives satisfied, the moratorium therefore
precluded regulation of CDSs as either gambling or insurance—
even as Wall Street institutions sold these securities as insur-
ance.1 Ironically, investors would have been better off taking
their funds to gambling casinos, which are closely regulated,
than investing them in the unregulated products sold on the
Street (Kim 2009).
Credit default swaps are by far the worst of these
“Frankenstein” products. Although commonly lumped together
with other derivatives, CDSs are not “derivatives” in the classic
sense, since their price is not based on, or “derived from,” some-
thing else. For true derivatives, such as oil futures or stock options,
the price relates to that of something that has a current, “cash
market” price; for example, there is a spot market price for oil
and current trading prices for particular stocks and equity indices.
By contrast, the CDS represents, in the words of risk analyst
Christopher Whalen (2009b), “a deliberate evasion of established
norms of transparency and safety and soundness, norms proven
in practice by the great bilateral cash and futures exchanges over
decades.” This customization, combined with market opacity, in
effect creates a huge financial windfall for Wall Street—which
explains why the banks have fought so tenaciously to retain the
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status quo despite almost blowing up the entire financial system
last year.
Just as describing credit default swaps as “derivatives” is
problematic, so, too, is the notion that CDSs act as a form of
“insurance.” In reality, a credit default swap gives the partici-
pant a vested interest in financial instability. True, they are
described as “insurance instruments,” but with crucial differ-
ences that actually invert the true role of insurance: one party,
the “protection buyer,” contracts with the insurer (“the protec-
tion seller”) to guarantee against the risk of default of a speci-
fied amount of exposure for a certain timeframe, but with a
twist: the protection buyer can sell the CDS, with the new owner
becoming the beneficiary of the insurance even if he has no
insurable interest in the underlying asset that is the subject of the
CDS (Mayer 2008). Likewise, the “protection seller” can offload
his risk by selling it to a third party, thereby multiplying the num-
ber of counterparties involved in the transaction.
But more significant than the multiplication of the coun-
terparty risk is the resultant financial instability, because CDSs
create huge perverse incentives. They lead investors to be indif-
ferent to a bankruptcy, and in many cases, to push for it. This is
the so-called “empty creditor” concept described by law profes-
sor Henry Hu in testimony before the Senate banking commit-
tee earlier this year:
Credit default swaps and other credit derivatives now per-
mit formal ownership of debt claims to be “decoupled”
from economic exposure to the risk of default or credit
deterioration. But formal ownership usually still conveys
control rights under the debt agreement and legal rights
under bankruptcy and other laws.
There could, for instance, be a situation involving what, in
2007, I termed an “empty creditor”: a creditor may have the
control rights flowing from the debt contract but, by
simultaneously holding credit default swaps, have little or
no economic exposure to the debtor. The creditor would
have weakened incentives to work with a troubled corpora-
tion for the latter to avoid bankruptcy. And if this empty
creditor status is undisclosed, the troubled corporation will
not know the true incentives of its creditor as the corpora-
tion attempts to seek relief in order to avoid bankruptcy.
Indeed, if a creditor holds enough credit default swaps, it may
simultaneously have control rights and a negative economic
exposure. With such an extreme version of the empty cred-
itor situation, the creditor would actually have incentives to
cause the firm’s value to fall. Debt decoupling could also
cause substantive (empty creditor) anddisclosure (“hidden
non-interest” and “hidden interest”) complications for
bankruptcy proceedings. (U.S. Congress 2009)
CDSs also create an incentive for lenders and investors to
skip or do a cursory job on credit research. Further, since the
CDS holder has little economic interest in the underlying asset,
why bother spending the time in a lengthy and costly Chapter
11–style debt renegotiation if you can collect immediately via
the proceeds of a credit default swap? 
Despite their obvious drawbacks and nonexistent social util-
ity, little has been done to rectify this obvious source of finan-
cial instability. In fact, one year after the demise of Lehman
Brothers, the Federal Reserve still refuses to enforce any credit
margin discipline over the principal CDS dealers. Similarly, the
most recent set of reforms proposed by the Obama administra-
tion resists mandating that these instruments be traded solely
on a regulated exchange, where transparency and standardiza-
tion would be far more operative and systemic risk correspond-
ingly reduced. Quite the contrary, in fact: we still have financial
engineering run amok. In the next section, we examine life 
settlement securities—another bad idea whose time has appar-
ently come.
Selling Death
Under Wall Street’s new proposal, investment banks will pack-
age life insurance policies of individuals with an alphabet soup
of diseases: AIDS, leukemia, lung cancer, heart disease, breast
cancer, diabetes, and Alzheimer’s. The idea is to diversify across
diseases to protect “investors” from the possibility that a cure
might be found for one or more afflictions, thus prolonging life
and reducing profits. These policies are the collateral behind
securities graded by those same agencies that thought subprime
mortgages should be rated as safe as U.S. Treasuries. Investors
purchase the securities, paying fees to mortgage banking origi-
nators. The underlying collateralized humans receive a fraction
of the death benefit up front as a single payout. Securities hold-
ers pay the life insurance premiums until the “collateral” dies, at
which point they receive the death benefits. Naturally, managed
money hopes death comes sooner rather than later.Policy Note, 2009/9 4
Moral hazards abound. There is a fundamental reason why
you are not permitted to take out fire insurance on your neigh-
bor’s house: you would have a strong interest in seeing that
house burn. If you held a life insurance policy on your neigh-
bor, you probably would not warn him about the loose lug nuts
on his Volvo. (If you had lost your job and were sufficiently
challenged ethically, you might even loosen them yourself.)
This product can be seen as the logical extension of the
CDS. Once finance creates a vehicle that separates the insuring
party from his insurable interest, these sorts of perverse incen-
tives are built into the system. And they multiply the impact of
a financial disaster, in addition to increasing counterparty risk: 
The basic tension over CDS starts with the fact that these
instruments actually increase overall systemic risk. Consider
a real world example: When the auto parts maker for General
Motors, Delphi, filed bankruptcy in October 2005, there were
between $20 and $30 billion in CDS outstanding and deliv-
erable against the $2 billion in debt outstanding and another
$2 billion in bank loans that were also deliverable against
the CDS. Whereas the maximum cash loss to investors in
the Delphi default might have been limited to the $4 billion
of extant debt without CDS, the existence of CDS actually
multiplied the potential opportunities for gain and loss on
the Delphi default nearly 10 fold. (Whalen 2009b)
Those hedge funds holding CDS “insurance” fought to force
the U.S. auto industry into bankruptcy for the simple reason
that they would make more from its demise than from its res-
urrection. And the reason that most holders of troubled mort-
gages cannot obtain relief is because the firms that service these
mortgages gain more from foreclosure than from a workout
loan. When Warren Buffet described derivatives as “financial
weapons of mass destruction,” he probably had this kind of sce-
nario in mind. Separation of ownership from financial interest
is the source of the problem.
Worse, securitization of life insurance policies actually cre-
ates incentives to ensure that our system doesn’t give us the
healthiest outcomes. A powerful alliance of Big Pharma and Big
Finance might well try to keep new miracle drugs off the mar-
ket; or, if these drugs were capable of extending life and thereby
reducing profits on the securities, make them prohibitively
expensive, thus curbing access. As an example, consider the pos-
sibility raised by columnist Matt Taibbi in regard to the bill that
has emerged from the Senate’s HELP Committee. Taibbi (2009)
notes that manufacturers of complex drugs known as “biolog-
ics” would be able to keep their formulas from being copied by
rivals for 12 years—twice as long as the protection for ordinary
pharmaceuticals. Granting lucrative new protections against
generic drugs not only substantially increases health care costs
but also ensures that cutting-edge treatment will be denied to
more people, which in turn will enhance the value of these secu-
ritized policies. 
This perverse logic could be extended to health care more
generally. Longevity is a big additional cost for the health care
industry; ideally, you need to create incentives to ensure that
people die younger. More people dead at age 55 and Presto! —
there go the waiting lists for hip replacement surgery, and pay-
outs to holders of life settlement products soar. Indeed, it is
fairly easy to see some profitable synergies developing between
financial firms marketing bets on death and health insurers
opposed to universal, single-payer health care.2
It is also worth noting that most of the same problems 
that were created in the securitized mortgage business will be
re-created in the market for securitized life insurance policies.
In this case, healthy individuals are the equivalent of “sub-
primes”: since they face a low probability of death, losses on the
securities are likely. Unscrupulous brokers will buy their poli-
cies and overstate the likelihood of death. An “originate to dis-
tribute” business will be created, whereby life insurance policies
will be sold indiscriminately without normal underwriting—
which in this case would involve checking the medical history
of the policyholder and consulting actuarial tables—since the
policies will be immediately bought, packaged, and sold. The
equivalent of “low doc” loans will be cases requiring little doc-
umentation of supposed terminal illness; “no docs” will simply
require the policyholder to claim a life-threatening affliction.
Ratings agencies will be called upon to certify risk, and compet-
itive pressures will prevent them from doing due diligence.
Securitizers will be tempted to sell securities without adequate
records of ownership, or to market bundled policies they do not
own—even selling credit default swaps on life insurance policies
in order to allow investors to acquire the risk without actually
owning the policies. Securities insurers will offer to take on 
the risk—another opening for CDSs, allowing more favorable
bets on the possibility of death. Policyholders will be defrauded,
since they will be paid far less than the actuarially based value
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by brokers. Leveraged money will flow in, creating an unsus-
tainable bubble.
A collapse of this market can occur even without miracle
drugs and higher-than-expected life spans simply due to the
normal operation of unchecked market processes. Thus, it is
likely that the bubble will be popped long before medical sci-
ence generates losses for gamblers in life settlements—at which
point Wall Street will look for the next investment opportunity. 
Conclusion
It should be amply evident that Wall Street hopes to re-create
the conditions that existed in 2005. Virtually every element that
contributed to the real estate, commodities, and CDS bubbles
will be replicated in the securitization of life insurance policies.
If this scheme succeeds, it will probably bankrupt the life insur-
ance companies. (Premiums are set on the assumption that many
policyholders will cancel long before death; but, once securi-
tized, the premiums will be paid so that benefits can be col-
lected.) If this new bubble actually materializes, another
financial crisis will not be far behind. While we understand that
there is a real need for some terminally ill patients to cash out
their life insurance policies (to cover care expenses, for exam-
ple), securitization is a path fraught with danger. 
In a significant sense, the situation is worse today than it
was in 2007 before the collapse. To date, the rescue of the finan-
cial sector has relied on a toxic package of policies that includes
socialization of risk, continued reliance on self-regulation, and
concentration of finance in the hands of 25 “megabanks” that
are said to be both “too big to fail” and “systemically impor-
tant.” The biggest of the behemoths, the deeply troubled Bank
of America (BoA), now holds 12 percent of all U.S. deposits.
The top four—BoA, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, and Wells
Fargo—collectively hold 46 percent of the assets of all FDIC-
insured banks, up from 37.7 percent a year ago. Goldman Sachs,
the largest securities firm before it was handed a bank charter,
has taken on more risk and increased its trading and investment
profits by two thirds over the past year. According to Nomi
Prins, formerly a managing director at Goldman, “Nothing has
changed except that we have larger players who are more pow-
erful, who are more dependent on government capital and who
are harder to regulate than they were to begin with. We’re in a
far less stable environment.”3
Radical reform is needed. Ideally, instruments such as
credit default swaps and life settlement securities ought to be
banned, since they operate against the public interest. At a min-
imum, the sale of CDS “protection” should be limited to those
with an economic interest in the default, such as the holders of
bonds, mortgages, or other assets that might be “insured.” No
one should be permitted to buy “insurance” to bet on another
person’s calamity: “By requiring buyers of protection to deliver
the underlying basis of the contracts, much of the systemic risk
created by the bilateral OTC credit model will be extinguished”
(Whalen 2009a). Further, all such contracts should be executed
on exchanges—and declared to be unenforceable if they are
not. Why should we extend the protection of enforcement by
U.S. courts of law to contracts,made in secret,that increase sys-
temic risk?
Here’s the problem: there is still, even after the massive losses
incurred in this crisis, far too much managed money chasing far
too few returns. And there are far too many “rocket scientists”
looking for the next “newest and bestest” financial product.
Each new product brings a rush of funds that narrows returns;
this then spurs rising leverage ratios, with borrowed funds
being used to make up for low spreads by increasing volume;
this causes risk to rise far too high to be covered by the returns.
And the risk-multiplication properties of CDSs allow more and
more players to join the game, both long and short. Eventually,
lenders and managed money try to get out, but delevering creates
a liquidity crisis as asset prices plunge. The resulting losses are
socialized as government bails out the banks. Repeat as needed.
Reform of the U.S. financial sector is not possible. Nor
would it ever be sufficient. What’s called for is downsizing of
the financial system, which can begin with the following set of
actions:
a)  All bank assets and liabilities must be brought onto balance
sheets and made subject to reserve and capital require-
ments—and, more importantly, to normal oversight by
appropriate regulatory agencies. Any assets and liabilities
that are left off balance sheet will be declared null and void,
unenforceable by U.S. courts.
b)  All CDSs must be bought and sold on regulated exchanges;
otherwise, they will be declared unenforceable by U.S. courts.
c)  Unless specifically approved by Congress, securitization of
financial products such as life insurance policies will be
prohibited and thus unenforceable by U.S. courts. In its
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financial products serve a legitimate public interest that
cannot be better served through some other mechanism.
d)  The FDIC will be directed to examine the books of the 25
largest insured banks in order to uncover all CDS contracts
held. These contracts will then be netted among the 25
banks, canceling any contracts the banks hold on one
another. CDS contracts with foreign banks will be unwound.
The FDIC will also examine derivative positions with a
view to determining whether unwinding these would be in
the public interest. The goal will be to downsize the balance
sheets of the “megabanks” in order to reduce systemic risk.
e)  In its examination, the FDIC will determine which of these
banks are insolvent based on current market values, after
netting positions. Those that are insolvent will be resolved.
Resolution will be accomplished with a goal of (1) mini-
mizing costs to the FDIC and (2) minimizing impacts on
the rest of the banking system. It will be necessary to cover
some uninsured losses, to other financial institutions as well
as to equity holders (such as pension funds), that arise in
the course of the resolution.
f)  The Treasury and Fed will be directed to work to reduce
concentration of the financial sector by avoiding resolution
methods that favor large institutions. There will be a bias in
favor of rescuing smaller institutions and using the resolu-
tion process to break up the larger ones.
These actions should substantially reduce the size of the
financial sector and would eliminate some of the riskiest assets,
including assets that serve no useful public purpose. The finan-
cial system would emerge with healthier institutions, and with
much less market concentration.4
Notes
1.  In 1999, Greenspan famously testified before Congress that
regulating derivatives was “superfluous,” thus helping pave
the way for repeal of the Depression-era laws separating
commercial and investment banking—and passage of the
deregulatory Commodity Futures Modernization Act the
following year. See Goodman 2008.
2.  None of this is far-fetched. As AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer
Richard Trumka recently remarked on NPR, we already
have so-called “death panels” deciding when to cut off care:
the private health insurers that deny coverage when proper
care would reduce company profits. It is not in the interest
of either securities holders or health insurers to provide
expensive care that prolongs the life of human collateral. 
3.  All data and quotes in this paragraph, Fitzgerald and
Harper 2009. 
4.  As this Policy Note went to press, a press release on
September 23 announced that Congressman Paul E.
Kanjorski (D-PA), Chairman of the House Financial Services
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and
Government Sponsored Enterprises will hold a hearing “to
examine innovations in securitization, especially those
related to life insurance settlements” (www.house.gov/apps/
list/press/financialsvcs_dem/presskanjorski_092309.shtml).
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